

Message Text

SECRET

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73

ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 EA-11 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 OMB-01 ACDA-19

AEC-11 DRC-01 /183 W

----- 064348

R 071341Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 715

INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

USINTSANA

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USLO PEKING
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL BOMBAY
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL MADRAS
CINCPAC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BRUSSELS 2803

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, PARM, IN, US, XO
SUBJ: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE INDIAN OCEAN

REF: NEW DELHI 5616

1. HAVING BEEN INCLUDED AMONG THE ADDRESSEES OF REFTEL,
I HEREWITH RESPOND TO AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN'S INVITATION
TO OUR DIPLOMATS TO DO SOME WORK.

2. I CONCUR IN AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN'S PLEA FOR:
--A QTE RATIONALE UNQTE THAT RELATES THE ROLE OF THE
U.S. NAVY TO U.S. INDIAN OCEAN POLICY (PARA 10);
-- QTE A MAJOR STATEMENT IN AN APPROPRIATE FORUM UNQTE
REITERATING QTE OUR DESIRE TO PROMOTE CONDITIONS OF PEACE
AND TRANQUILITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA UNQTE (PARA 13-A);
--QTE ACTIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH RELEVANT COUNTRIES
ON THE ISSUE OF INDIAN OCEAN RESTRAINTS UNQTE (PARA 13-C).

3. A QTE RATIONALE UNQTE FOR U.S. NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN
THE INDIAN OCEAN IS A BASIC REQUIREMENT OF OUR OWN POLICY
AND WILL LARGELY DETERMINE OUR APPROACH TO ALL ISSUES
IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THAT OF QTE RESTRAINTS UNQTE.
B. A STATEMENT REITERATING QTE OUR DESIRE TO
PROMOTE CONDITIONS...ETC. UNQTE, THOUGH COUCHED IN
UN RHETORIC, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STATED POLICIES
OF THIS ADMINISTRATION, NAMELY, TO KEEP STEADY THE
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BALANCE OF POWER IN THIS REGION AS WELL AS IN ANY
OTHER.
C. SINCE OTHER PARTIES ARE CONSULTING ANYWAY, AND
SINCE SOME PARTIES ARE CONSULTING IN ORDER TO DIS-
COMFIT US, THERE IS NO GOOD REASON FOR REMAINING
ALOOF RATHER THAN INSERTING OUR DIPLOMATIC FINESSE
INTO THE CURRENT DEBATE ON WHO CAN OR CANNOT DO WHAT
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA.

4. I SUGGEST THAT, BEFORE WE PROCEED BEYOND (A), (B),
AND (C), WE TAKE A LONG, DEEP BREATH.

5. THE FORMULATIONS OF QTE RESTRAINTS, LIMITATIONS
AND ZONES UNQTE AND OF QTE CRITERIA UNQTE THEREOF ARE,
IN MATTERS OF NAVAL STRATEGY, FRAUGHT WITH AWESOME
DIFFICULTIES. FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN, IN PARTICULAR,
SUCH FORMULATIONS ARE NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE, FOR THE
INDIAN OCEAN, AS A PHYSICAL ENTITY, DOES NOT EXIST.
THE INDIAN OCEAN EXISTS ONLY AS A NAME ON A MERCATOR
PROJECTION OF THE GLOBE. IN FACT, THE WATERS THAT
ON A MERCATOR MAP ARE LABELLED INDIAN OCEAN, ARE
BUT PART OF THE GREAT WORLD OCEAN THAT REFUSES TO
LET ITSELF BE DIVIDED UP INTO NON-COMMUNICATING LAKES.
IT IS IN THE VERY NATURE OF A NAVY THAT IT CAN GO
WHEREEVER THE WATER IS DEEP ENOUGH FOR IT TO FLOAT.
TO ATTEMPT TO FORMULATE QTE RESTRAINTS UNQTE UPON THE
MOVEMENTS OF NAVAL POWER IN ONE QTE OCEAN UNQTE IS,
POLITICALLY, A VERY, VERY RISKY UNDERTAKING. HAVING
FORMULATED RESTRAINTS IN ONE QTE OCEAN UNQTE, WILL WE
NOT BE COMPELLED TO EXTEND THEM TO ALL THE OTHERS OR,
RATHER, TO THE ONE WORLD OCEAN?

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BRUSSELS 2803

6. I QUITE AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN'S DEFINITION
QTE MENAGERIE, NOT A SPECIES UNQTE OF THE CONGERIES
OF THE RIPARTIAN STATES. INDEED, DESPITE INDIA'S ASSE-
TIONS TO THE CONTRARY, THERE IS NO COMMON INTEREST THAT
JOINS TOGETHER THE REGIONAL PEOPLES, NOT TO SPEAK OF
THE OUTSIDE POWERS THAT HAVE A STAKE--OR WANT A SAY--
IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT
LITORAL STATES ARE ALSO ATLANTIC OR PACIFIC OR ARCTIC
OCEAN POWERS. SOME OF THE OTHERS ARE, AS REGARDS THE
ORIENTATION OF THEIR ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS,
AS MUCH MEDITERRANEAN OR NEAR EASTERN STATES AS THEY

ARE INDIAN OCEAN STATES. NO ONE IN HIS OR HER RIGHT MIND, NOT EVEN MRS. GANDHI, EXPECTS THESE ODDLY ASSORTED NATIONS TO AGREE UPON QTE RESTRAINTS UNQTE.

7. INDEED, THE PRESSRE GENERATED FOR AN QTE OCEAN OF PEACE UNQTE IS, IN PART, SELF SERVING, IN PART, MISCHIEVOUS, AND, IN PART, ROMANTIC. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE MOST VOCAL ADVOCATES OF A QTE FORCE-FREE UNQTE INDIAN OCEAN ARE THE LEAST CONSISTENT ONES. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE THE PRIME MINISTER OF CEYLON, WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE ORIGINATED THE CONCEPT BEFORE MRS. GANDHI HAD THOUGHT OF IT; WHO HAD SINGLED OUT THE U.S. NAVY AS THE INTRUDER UPON THE QTE ZONE OF PEACE UNQTE, AND WHO HAD PROFESSED HERSELF INCREDULOUS ABOUT THE SOVIET VAVAL PRESENCE, WELCOMED ENTHUSIASTICALLY, UPON THE EFEAT OF PAKISTAN, THE PRESENCE OF THE ENTERPRISE
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SOMEWHERE OFF THE MALABAR COAST. THE DEFEAT OF PAKISTAN HAVING CHANGED THE LOCAL BALANCE OF POWER, MADAME BANDARANAIKE DID NOT FAULT WHAT SHE PERCEIVED AS A U.S. ATTEMPT TO HELP RIGHT IT BY A DISPLAY OF U.S. NAVAL POWER.

8. IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT U.S. DIPLOMACY SHORE UP, POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY, OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. I DEEM IT EQUALLY DESIRABLE THAT OUR DIPLOMACY AVOID THE SEMANTIC TRAPS HIDDEN BENEATH THE ARGUMENTS FOR QTE RESTRAINTS UNQTE. IN THE LAST RESPORT, OUR BEST BET IS STILL TO APPEAL TO REASON--TO THE REASON OF THOSE WHO ARE AMENABLE TO REASONED ARGUMENT. A GOOD MANY INDIAN OCEAN STATESMEN ARE FULLY AWARE OF HOW LIMITED AND, ESSENTIALLY, STATUS QUO PROTECTIVE ARE OUR INTERESTS IN THE INDIAL OCEAN AREA--AND THIS DESPITE WHAT THEY MAY SAY PUBLICLY IN THE OUTSIDE THE U.N. THE PROPER ROAD TO RESTRAINTS UPON FORCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ARE IS THE ONE WE HAVE TAKEN, I.E., VIA NPT AND GENEVA, AND NOT VIA SCHEMES FOR REGIONAL DEMILITARIZATION. OF COURSE, THERE ARE SOME INDIAN OCEAN POLITICAL LEADERS WHO DO NOT WANT TO BE REASONED WITH, FOR THEY STRIVE, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, TO DMINISH OUR INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE AND POWER. EVEN A QTE MAJOR (U.S.) STATEMENT...OF OUR SUPPORT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF A PEACEFUL INDIAN OCEAN UNQTE WILL NOT APPEASE THEM. VIS-A-VIS THESE HOSTILE CRITICS, A LITTLE INDIFFERENCE WILL GO ALONG WAY.

9. IN SUM, I URGE THAT WE APPROACH THE PROBLEM OF QTE RESTRAINTS UNQTE RESTRAINTS UNQTE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA IN THE

MOST RESTRAINED FASHION AND DO NOT YIELD EVEN ONE
PARTICLE OF SUBSTANCE TO PROPAGANDISTIC EXPEDIENCY.
STRAUSZ-HUPE

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